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The Curious Case of the Occidental and Regal: The Evolution of Solvency 
and Disclosure Standards in the Australian Life Insurance Industry 
 
 
In 1990 the Australian life insurance industry was rocked by scandal which 
threatened to destabilise consumer confidence in the ability of insurance 
providers to meet policy holder liabilities. The incident highlighted the 
nature of the agency problems which arise when conditions of asymmetric 
information exist. It revealed systemic weaknesses in accounting, solvency 
and disclosure standards as they applied to life insurers. This paper uses an 
evolutionary concept of agency to analyse government and industry 
responses to this event. It is argued that initial adaptive responses stabilised 
the industry and averted a more serious crisis. Longer term innovative 
responses led to the introduction of a new and more rigorous approach to 
reporting and solvency standards which has improved information flows 
and agency outcomes. 
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Introduction 
The spectacular collapse of several insurance companies in recent 
times has put the spotlight on the issues of corporate governance which 
arise from the activities of financial institutions and the regulatory 
environment in which such institutions operate. The Australian life 
insurance industry provides an interesting case study giving insight into the 
manner in which markets react to financial shocks. The crisis in this 
instance was an attempted fraud perpetrated against the Occidental Life and 
the Regal Life insurance companies in 1990. Analysis of this event provides 
an explanation of how financial shocks precipitate responses that contribute 
to changes in the nature of regulation in the industry and approaches to 
solvency standards and reporting requirements 
In tracing the evolution of regulatory control of the life insurance 
industry it is possible to determine the pattern and motivation underlying 
the development of accounting and solvency standards in that industry. 
Prior to 1995 the extent of control of the life insurance industry within 
Australia was relatively light in comparison to other parts of the financial 
sector. Despite this, there had been very few crises in confidence in the 
industry. In fact, in the 45 years since the first federal act was promulgated 
no registered Australian life insurer had reneged on its obligations to policy 
holders or faced the prospect of insolvency. It is argued that one reason for 
this was that the mutual heritage of the industry was associated with a level 
of self regulation which influenced industry standards. Self regulation, 
whilst not explicit as it was in the general insurance industry, nevertheless 
established an implicit industry code which influenced the behaviour of 
firms within the market. This code was broken in 1990 when the statutory 
funds of two insurance companies, the Occidental Life and the Regal Life 
were plundered in an aborted attempt to sell the two companies. The 
incident sent shock waves through the financial community. It not only 
highlighted flaws in the regulatory requirements imposed on the industry, 
but also standards of accounting and solvency practices employed by life 
insurers. It resulted in immediate action both by government and the 
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sector was maintained.  
This event occurred at a time when the financial sector and the life 
insurance industry were experiencing a period of significant upheaval 
associated with the adjustments inspired by the general lifting of regulatory 
controls by successive Australian governments. It is argued in this paper 
that the changing environment in which life insurers operated impacted on 
the existing form of regulation and weakened the implicit regulatory code of 
behaviour which had influenced the conduct of life insurance business in 
Australia. This created opportunities for avoidance and abuse that were 
highlighted in the case of the Occidental and Regal. The crisis in the 
industry which the attempted sale of these companies inspired initiated a 
series of institutional responses that changed the manner in which life 
offices operated and were regulated. 
 The aim of this paper is to review the regulatory framework within 
which the life insurance industry operated and analyse the response to a 
shock to the system that challenged the foundations of the structure of rules 
which governed industry conduct. The implications for the management and 
control of solvency standards will be discussed. The paper will proceed by 
considering a theoretical framework by which to evaluate the challenge to 
established rules. It will then discuss the approach to regulation in the life 
insurance industry and the crisis which precipitated the change in this 
approach. Finally it will evaluate the outcomes in terms of the responses 
and implications for agency arrangements. 
 
Theoretical Frameworks 
Various interpretative frameworks may be adopted in analysing 
responses to pressures for change in organisational or management 
procedures. The work of Alfred Chandler for example, suggests that the 
nature of the firms capabilities and skills are the most important factor in 
determining the types of opportunities the firm can utilise within its 
environmental context. The development path of firms provide the key to 
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understanding the behaviour of markets and the pattern of broader 
economic growth (Chandler, 1992,p. 99). 
New institutional theory, with its emphasis on transaction cost 
economics, points to the reasons why firms adopt certain strategies. The 
problems of asymmetric information and bounded rationality influence the 
outcome of the firms activities.  A result of this is that the organisation 
which develops is argued to be that which deals with transactions costs 
most efficiently. In this respect the emphasis is placed on the transaction as 
the focus of analysis (Chandler, 1992, p.85). An alternative explanation of 
the behaviour of firms is to view them as a ‘nexus of contracts’ which 
evolve to resolve the specific problems associated with the divisions 
between principals and agents. Agency theory assumes that organisational 
forms which evolve are the outcome of attempts to resolve  issues arising 
from the relationship between the principal and the agent. Again the 
problems of asymmetric information and opportunistic behaviour must be 
resolved. The organisation which results is deemed to be efficient otherwise 
it would not continue to exist in the competitive environment (Douma and 
Schreuder, 1992, p.101). Unlike the transaction cost analysis, the emphasis 
here is on the firm. 
A limitation of these approaches in analysing the historical 
development of a particular industry or sector is that they focus on changing 
strategies within the confines of existing institutional parameters. 
Evolutionary theory on the other hand, considers the impact of the 
institutional setting. It suggests that firms adapt overtime in reaction to their 
environment (Westall, 1997, p.56). Firms learn strategies and processes 
which they are constantly adapting to improve organisational capabilities. 
In this way firms, and the markets in which they operate expand and grow 
(Nelson, 1991, pp.66-9; Chandler 1992, pp.86-7).  
The difference between the two approaches can best be described as 
the difference between process and content. Evolutionary theory may be 
classified as a process theory, describing the manner in which  the strategies 
of the firm evolve. New institutional theories at the opposite end of the 
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(Douma and Schreuder, 1992, p.170-1). Both approaches have much to add 
to the analysis of particular aspects of the behaviour and development of 
organizations. In recent times attempts have been made to synthesise these 
approaches and move towards more dynamic explanations of why firms 
respond and evolve as they do. Casson (1997) and Lazonick (2002) develop 
theoretical extensions of the models which expand on the basic principles of 
the institutional and evolutionary approaches.
1 Knutson (1999) and Chandar 
and Miranti (2005) have applied synthesised models to specific examples of 
adaptive responses to changing environmental factors. The approach taken 
in this paper is to apply a similar methodology when investigating the 
processes of change, both institutional and firm specific, inspired by the 
Occidental and Regal affair.  
Corporate governance problems have often been associated with the 
existence of agency problems. Within the financial sector agency issues 
have been said to permeate the entire structure of financial firms (Davis, 
1995, p.44). Problems are compounded because there are a number of 
stakeholders involved. In the life insurance industry this includes 
shareholders, policy holders, management and government regulators. 
Agency problems arise within these groups because the responsibility for 
decision making is delegated from one set of stakeholders to another under 
conditions of asymmetric information (Davis, 1995, p.44). Conventional 
analysis of such problems would focus on the short term responses 
assuming the institutional responses remained constant. This point is made 
by Chandar and Miranti (2005, p. 10), who argued that in a period of 
economic transition the role of institutions cannot be assumed to be passive. 
To gain a greater appreciation of the impact of agency problems Chandar 
and Miranti place them within the context of an evolutionary interpretation. 
The methodology they employ considers the process of institutional change 
and its relationship with changes in business models and practices. This 
approach is of relevance when applied to a specific crisis and its 
implications for the environment in which firms operate. Taking the 
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example of the bankruptcies which occurred in the American railway 
industry in the 1890s Chandar and Miranti demonstrate how innovative 
regulatory institutions emerged to reduce agency risks and improve 
corporate governance systems (Chandar and Miranti 2005, pp. 25-26). A 
similar approach is taken in this paper. An evolutionary concept of agency 
is used to analyse the responses and  outcomes of a shock to the financial 
environment in which life insurance firms operated and the implications for 
the development of solvency standards. Such an approach allows a 
distinction to be made between the initial adaptive response to a crisis and a 
later innovative response leading to improvements in agency relationships. 
 
Approaches to Life Insurance Regulation 
The basis of regulation of the Australian life insurance industry had 
its origins in the British Life Insurance Companies Act of 1870. In this 
respect a crisis precipitated by the collapse of two companies, the European 
and the Albert in 1869, acted as a spur for legislative action. The failure of 
these insurance companies highlighted the agency problems associated with 
life insurance. The regulatory response in reaction to these problems 
influenced not only the future institutional/firm relationships in Britain but 
also in Australia for the next century and more. The significance of the  
British act was that it established the principles upon which regulation was 
undertaken. The prime purpose of insurance regulation was to protect the 
solvency of companies and in so doing, guarantee that contracts made 
between policy holders and insurance firms could be met.  
A regulatory approach may be either active with strong supervisory 
provisions, or passive relying on the market to self regulate to a large 
extent. The method enshrined in the British Act of 1870 relied on passive 
methods of control. The principle of 'freedom with disclosure' established 
with the Act of 1870 allowed firms to conduct their business in an 
unrestricted manner. The only proviso being they published enough 
information to enable the regulator, and the public, to establish the financial 
position of the company. The alternate philosophy underlying life insurance 
      8legislation was that of supervision or public disclosure. Such an approach 
was adopted by European and American regulators who played a more 
active role in ensuring solvency requirements were met (Royal Commission 
1910,p.8: Westall, 1991, p.144).  
Prior to 1945 life insurance regulation was both weak and unco-
ordinated. Each of the six states pursued their own regulatory agenda. The 
earliest and most comprehensive legislation was enacted in Victoria in 
1873. Other Australian parliaments followed suit, with the exception of 
NSW which did not enact any direct legislation covering the life insurance 
sector. Public disclosure was the basic control mechanism adopted by the 
various states to ensure that firms conformed to a certain set of standards 
with respect to the protection of policy holder rights. The main thrust of the 
various forms of legislation was to ensure that life insurance funds were 
kept separate from other company funds and to establish a minimum deposit 
requirement to be held with a specified government office. General 
supervision was very light relying on the publicity provision to ensure firms 
conformed. The only state with a statutory solvency requirement was 
Victoria which required the company to be wound up if it was proved to be 
insolvent (Keneley, 2005, p.8). 
In 1945 the Australian government legislated to introduce national 
regulation of the industry. The Life Insurance Act 1945 superseded all state 
legislation and brought the industry under one regulatory umbrella. The 
significance of the Act lay in establishing a uniform regulatory environment 
that set minimum standards of probity and business conduct. These 
standards included deposit requirements, prescribed forms of annual 
reporting and the setting of a minimum valuation standard. This standard set 
the minimum interest rate for discounting future liabilities and contributions 
and formed the basis for solvency calculations. To facilitate the operation of 
the Act, each life insurance company was required to apply for registration 
to the Office of the Life Insurance Commissioner, established to ensure 
statutory requirements were met. The regulation of the industry was centred 
on three measures. First, that a firm’s life insurance be separated from other 
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insurance business. Firms were required to establish a statutory fund for all 
life insurance funds received. Second, that the firm conduct its business 
according to a set of standards. These standards were monitored indirectly 
through a comparative reporting system which required the firm provide 
specific details to the Life Insurance Commissioner annually. Solvency was 
assessed on the basis of the firm maintaining a required excess of assets 
over liabilities. This was measured according to the minimum valuation 
basis mentioned above. The third measure gave the Life Insurance 
Commissioner the power take action if warranted. However this authority 
was not direct. To intervene in the operation of the firm the Commissioner 
could apply to the Federal Court for an order for the judicial management or 
winding up of the company (Caffin, 1955 p.158; Joske, 1948, p.136). 
Supervision of the industry became more comprehensive after the Life 
Insurance Act 1945 but it by no means monitored every aspect of the 
company’s affairs, or imposed strict solvency requirements. Nevertheless 
the approach was remarkably successful in attaining stability within the 
industry. It was not until 45 years after the Act was introduced that the first 
real crisis in confidence occurred and the Life Insurance Commission was 
called upon to use it powers of judicial management. This event occurred in 
1990 when a case of fraud committed against the policy holders of the 
Occidental Life Insurance Company of Australia Ltd. and the Regal 
Insurance Company Ltd posed a serious challenge to the efficacy of the 
regulatory provisions. The timing of this incident, during a period of 
substantial change within the financial sector, was significant. It points to a 
reason why such an event occurred when it did. Changes in fundamental 
relationships between government, banks and other parts of the financial 
sector, as a result of the deregulatory push, altered agency associations. This 
is in turn opened the door to certain types of opportunistic behaviour which 
had not been countenanced before. Davis (1995, pp.45-46) argues that 
financial deregulation reduced constraints on managers. Moreover, it was 
not accompanied by improvements in corporate governance which 
realigned the interests of managers and stakeholders. This in turn led to 
      10failings in managerial decision making and corporate governance resulting 
in financial failures in the 1980s. The case of the Occidental and Regal is an 
example of how such behaviour was manifest in the life insurance industry. 
 
The Pattern of Development in the Life Insurance Market to 
1990 
The explanation of why there was no financial crisis in the life 
insurance industry until 1990 lies in the nature and structure of the industry 
to that point. Traditionally the life insurance market had been dominated by 
a group of large mutual insurers which had historically been market leaders 
that set the standards by which the industry operated. A feature of the 
development of the Australian life insurance industry which distinguishes it 
from experiences in other countries is the significance of mutual 
associations (Keneley, 2001, p.146). Although there were only a small 
number of mutuals they traditionally accounted for a substantial share of 
assets and premiums sold. Mutual associations captured and retained a large 
market share from a very early stage in the development of the industry. Up 
to the 1990s the top five firms which were all mutual insurers had held in 
excess of 70 per cent of industry assets (Keneley, 2002, p.67).  
The existence of large mutual firms in the industry had important 
bearings on agency relationships and repercussions for the conduct of the 
market. These firms were the overseers of an informal system of self 
regulation which established the codes of conduct by which life offices 
abided. This system evolved from the early development of life insurance 
and actuarial practice which resulted in the introduction of professional 
associations such as the insurance institutes and actuarial organisations. The 
Life Offices Association of Australia was a more recent incarnation of these 
associations. From an early point in the history of the industry, the 
managers of major mutual funds had been instrumental in determining 
standards of practice and codes of behaviour as well as actuarial 
conventions. So much so, that by the 1950s the chief executive officers of 
organisations such as the Australian Mutual Provident (AMP) and the 
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National Mutual Life (NML) were recognised industry leaders not only in 
Australia but internationally. The life insurance community in Australia was 
a small and tightly knit group and the executives of the leading offices 
played an influential part in the associations and organisations which set 
industry standards. Actuaries from the AMP for example, were instrumental 
in founding the Actuarial Society of New South Wales (later Australasia) 
and the state based insurance institutes. They also played a leading role in 
establishing the system of examination used for the accreditation of 
insurance officers (Bellis, 1997, p.57; Wickens, pp.41-47). 
The dominance of mutual firms in this hierarchy meant that 
underlying mutual philosophies that determined the approach to business 
also became the standard by which the industry operated. This approach 
upheld the interests of policy holders over shareholders. Under this type of 
system the need for active as opposed to passive government regulation was 
seen as unnecessary. The industry demonstrated that it was effectively self 
regulating under the influence of the large mutuals. 
The environment in which life insurers operated was altered 
permanently with the progressive move to deregulate the financial sector 
which gained momentum in the 1980s. The influence of the large mutuals in 
the life insurance industry was weakened as new players entered the market 
and competition altered the status quo. The dismantling of regulatory 
controls began in the early 1980s. During this time, restrictions on the 
commercial activities of banks were abolished and ‘captive’ market 
requirements on banks and life insurers were removed (Davis, 1997, p. 4). 
Deregulation had far reaching implications for the structure and conduct of 
financial markets. With this opening up of the sector, barriers to entry and 
the segmentation of markets were reduced promoting an industry 
reorganisation. The number of registered life insurers increased from 45 in 
1980 to 58 in 1990 and was also accompanied by a shift in market power 
amongst these firms. Historically the industry had been highly concentrated 
with the top three firms accounting for in excess of 70 per cent of industry 
assets. Notably these firms were all mutuals. Whilst the number of foreign 
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capturing a significant market share. Levels of concentration began to fall in 
the decade from 1980 when the deregulation of the financial sector 
occurred. The industry percentage of assets held by the top three mutual 
insurers had fallen to 55 per cent in 1990 (ISC, 1990-1). The decline in 
mutual representation was associated with an increase in bank owned 
insurers share of assets. The rise in the influence of banks within the 
industry occurred as deregulation allowed banks to market life insurance 
products directly instead of the previous indirect practice of selling life 
insurance products though a subsidiary arrangement. The first bank to enter 
the life market directly was the National Australia Bank in 1985 and over 
the next three to four years the other major banks followed suit.  
  In addition to increased competition from banks, life insurers faced 
a number of other pressures at this time. The unbundling of insurance 
products, a trend which began in the 1970s, had brought life companies into 
more direct competition with other savings and investment institutions. The 
separation of life insurance products between mortality risk and investment 
earnings led to the creation of a whole range of investment linked products 
and placed a much greater emphasis on short term performance than had 
previously been the case in the life insurance industry. This trend was 
reinforced in the uncertain financial climate of the late 1980s. Life insurers 
came under pressure to subsidise short term returns with either injections of 
capital, forgoing dividends or the use of reserves. Major life offices also 
suffered losses after the stock market crash of 1987 through the activities of 
their affiliated companies. The AMP for example, lost over $75 million 
through the Chase AMP bank’s dealings with the Quintex group (Blainey, 
1999, p.300). Other insurers were also caught up in the corporate excesses 
of the 1980s through their subsidiary companies. 
  Concurrent with the greater emphasis on short term results, 
continually high inflation was leading to expense overrun and placing 
pressure on traditional life insurance business where the margin for 
expenses allocated from premium income was not sufficient (ISC,1990-1). 
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The restructuring of the financial sector inspired by the lifting of 
regulatory controls on banks altered the nature of agency relationships. 
Banks were now able to compete directly in the same markets as other 
financial service providers. Life insurers responded by diversifying into 
other financial markets. This broadened the risks associated with the 
delegation of decision making processes by policy holders to life office 
management. Competitive forces and market instability combined to impact 
on the mutual structure which had been the backbone of the industry for 
nearly 150 years. The market was undergoing a transition which would 
eventually lead to a organisational restructuring of the leading life offices 
and the disappearance of the mutual life insurer. The transition period was 
associated with a weakening of the influence of the large mutuals within the 
industry and the effectiveness of the self regulatory system associated with 
them. Davis (1995, p.46) points out that deregulation was not accompanied 
by any improvements in corporate governance or market discipline which 
realigned managerial interests with other stakeholders. This opened the door 
for potential mismanagement and abuse of corporate responsibility. The 
fraud perpetrated against the policyholders of the Occidental and Regal 
insurance companies was an outcome of this trend. The mismanagement of 
the affairs of these two companies exposed a major weakness in the 
supervisory framework under which life insurance in Australia was 
conducted and presented a systemic threat to the financial services sector 
(Glading, 1991, p.18). 
 
The Incident 
The Occidental Life insurance company was a medium sized firm 
which specialised in term and disability insurance as well as some 
investment products. The Regal was a small life insurance company, 
previously known as Royal Life Insurance Ltd. Both companies were 
owned by the Battery group. The major shareholders of the Battery group 
came under pressure to reduce their gearing and the decision was made to 
sell the two companies. The buyer was Heath Holdings a shelf company 
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sale was $132 million Australian, $65 million of which was to be paid up 
front in the form of two cheques payable to the Battery group bankers. It 
was the intention of the Battery group management to apply these funds 
directly to the repayment of company debt. The transaction took place on 
the evening of Friday 28th of September 1990. The following Monday it 
was discovered that $65 million of the two life insurers statutory funds were 
missing. It had apparently been used to finance the transaction (Manson, 
1990, p.22). This incident threatened the solvency of the two companies and 
its ability to meet policy holder liabilities. 
The audacity of this scam sent shockwaves through the insurance 
sector. It pointed to shortcomings in the informational structures used by 
life insurers in reporting financial details and upon which agency contracts 
were based. It exposed serious deficiencies in the information available to 
policyholders and in the safeguards protecting their assets.  
Two central problems highlighted the weaknesses in the 
informational structure upon which contracts between company 
management and policyholders were based. Firstly, there were no 
accounting standards for life insurers. The manner in which life insurance 
revenues were invested and the fees and charges applied could not be 
determined by the policy holder. It was also not possible to analyse the 
expenses of the company to gauge whether such costs could be recovered in 
the long run. Furthermore, life insurers were exempt from the accounts and 
disclosure requirements of the Companies Act. This meant that published 
accounts did not show a ‘true and fair’ view of their financial position. The 
second problem arose from the inadequacy of solvency disclosure 
requirements in the 1945 Act. The Life Insurance Act 1945 did not contain 
any clear definition of solvency. The statutory reporting requirements under 
the Act provided for two sets of returns or schedules. The first schedule 
contained the balance sheet and revenue account of the firm. The second 
detailed the returns of the company relating to new policies sold and 
policies in force. This schedule represented information about the liabilities 
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to policy holders. In addition, periodic actuarial investigations were 
conducted into the value of the firms policy liabilities according the 
specified standard of evaluation. The information contained in these returns 
was meant to indicate the solvency margins of the firm. However the 
required presentation of the information made it very difficult to determine 
precisely the extent of reserves or margins. One commentator summed up 
the position in stating that the two schedules were ‘virtually meaningless in 
assessing the true financial position and profitability of life companies’ 
(Findlater, 1990,p.70).  
 
Adaptive Responses 
The initial response to the crisis engendered by the fraud perpetrated on the 
Occidental and Regal companies was the appointment of a judicial 
manager. Under Sections 59-60 of the Life Insurance Act 1945, the Life 
Insurance Commissioner could apply to the Federal Court for the 
appointment of a judicial manager to take over control of the company. This 
occurred for the first time in 1990. The reports of the judicial manager at 
this time highlighted a number of problems with the companies in respect to 
the preservation of policyholder assets and their dealing with their statutory 
funds (Davis, 2004, p.244). Serious concerns were expressed regarding the 
solvency of the statutory funds of these two companies (ISC 1990-91 p.18; 
Australian Financial Review 8.11.1990, p.4). 
  The reports of the judicial manager also reinforced the concern over 
deficiencies in the existing Act. Even if the Insurance Commissioner 
suspected that there may be an underlying problem with the solvency of a 
firm’s statutory funds he had little power to question the directors’ 
valuations of assets. In addition the Act did not require that the 
Commissioner be given notice in advance of any proposed takeover or 
change in control. He was unable to ensure the protection of policy holder 
assets in this regard. The Act relied on the co-operation of life insurers in 
this respect (Glading, 1991,pp.17-19). 
      16Whilst the specific issue of the missing funds of the two companies 
became tied up in the courts, the government moved to ensure that 
policyholder funds were protected in the future. Four Acts were passed in 
1991. These were the: Insurance Supervisory Levy Bill, the Insurance 
Acquisitions and Takeover Bill, Life Insurance Policy Holders Protection 
Levies Bill and the Life Insurance Policy Holders Protection Collection 
Bill. These acts were designed to achieve two basic outcomes. Firstly to 
raise revenue from the industry to provide a degree of protection for the 
policy holders of the Occidental and Regal. Secondly to broaden the powers 
of the Life Insurance Commissioner with respect to changes in ownership 
and control of life insurance companies and the rights of policy holders. 
These actions represented modifications to existing practices in the 
industry. They did not address the more fundamental informational 
problems revealed by the crisis.  
The industry itself adopted a similar approach. The peak industry 
association, the Life Insurance Federation of Australia, resolved to cover 
the $65 million loss from the two companies’ statutory funds. They also 
committed the industry to working towards an outcome which would insure 
policyholder rights were protected. Although it took three years for the 
issue to be fully resolved, the result was an industry/regulator negotiated 
solution which obviated the need to impose harsher regulatory penalties on 
life offices. The business of the Occidental and Regal was transferred to a 
major life insurer allowing most policy holders to receive the full value of 
their policies (ISC,1993-94 p.42). The Levies Acts were never implemented 
and the legislation was subsequently repealed in 1995. 
The adaptive response of government and industry averted a major 
loss of confidence and crisis in the life insurance sector. It reinforced the 
ability of the industry to maintain standards and protect policy holder assets 
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Innovative Responses: Reform of the Life Insurance Act 1945 
The immediate changes implemented to deal with the results of the 
Occidental and Regal case did not improve the informational aspects upon 
which policy holders made decisions and agency relationships were formed. 
Measurement and reporting of solvency standards had not altered and there 
were still no generally accepted accounting standards for life insurers. Many 
companies had adopted a modified versions of accounting reporting 
practices but these were designed more for internal reporting and were not a 
legislative requirement. The fundamental problems highlighted by the 
Occidental and Regal incident remained. However, the case confirmed 
amongst many in government and industry the need for an overhaul of the 
1945 Life Insurance Act. It was from this belief that further more 
fundamental responses evolved.  
  Reform and the implementation of more fundamental change 
occurred with the passing of the Life Insurance Act 1995. Whilst the 
essential philosophy underpinning the approach to regulation remained the 
same, the manner in which it was implemented altered. The focus of reform 
with respect to the issues raised by the Occidental and Regal incident 
centred on three main areas. These were the responsibilities of directors to 
protect policy holders’ interests, reporting requirements and solvency 
requirements. Improvements in these three matters led to upgraded 
informational flows. The net effect of these changes was to improve the 
agency relationships between the stakeholders involved by increasing 
transparency and standardising solvency accounting procedures. 
  The approach taken in reforming prudential supervision of the life 
insurance industry was to continue with the basis on which the Life 
Insurance Act 1945 was written. This approach reinforced the self 
regulatory role of the market in placing the responsibility for the health of 
the company with its directors and advisors. Direct intervention was viewed 
as a last resort, the emphasis being on the company to resolve issues which 
threatened the stability of the firm (Thorburn, 1995, p.59).  
      18Changes introduced clarified the obligations of firms and their 
directors. The Act required that an insurer give priority to the interests of 
policy holders in respect to the management, administration and investment 
of statutory funds. The Act further specified that the directors should, with 
reasonable care and due diligence, protect the interests of policy holders 
above the interests of shareholders (Sutton,1995,p.481). Further 
clarification was made with respect to the assets of the company and 
statutory funds. A point of confusion, which was highlighted by the 
Occidental and Regal case, was who was directly accountable to policy 
holders and the regulator for the management of statutory funds (Klumpes, 
1991, p.41). The 1995 placed responsibility to protect policy holder 
interests with the directors of the company. 
To insure that directors were in a position to represent the interests 
of policy holders, increased responsibilities were proscribed for actuaries 
and auditors in the management of the firms affairs. Included in these 
responsibilities was a ‘ whistle blowing role’ to the regulator. Actuaries and 
auditors were obliged to report activities within the firm which may 
prejudice the interests of policyholders (Thorburn, 1995).  
  To further improve information available to and provided by life 
insurers the Act established the Life Insurance Actuarial Standards Board 
(LIASB). The Board was appointed by government and its function was to 
support a new financial reporting regime which reflected methods of 
realistic valuation and transparency of disclosure. The LIASB was charged 
with responsibility for establishing six main actuarial standards. These were 
in relation to valuation of policy liabilities, determination of solvency and 
capital requirements, capital requirements for shareholder funds, calculation 
minimum surrender values and valuation of performance guarantees in 
investment linked funds. Previously these matters had been handled by the 
office the Insurance Commission with the issuing of periodic directives and 
circulars. The 1995 Act established a much more formal reporting regime in 
which companies were judged against a specific set of standards as 
determined by the LIASB. The ‘appointed actuary’ of each company was 
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required to report to the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
(APRA) annually on the company’s financial position with particular 
reference to the actuarial standards.
2
  The most significant and innovative changes introduced by the Act 
related to capital and solvency requirements. A two tier solvency 
requirement was imposed on statutory funds. The first tier established a 
Solvency Standard aimed at ensuring existing liabilities could be met as 
they fell due. The second tier introduced a Capital Adequacy Standard 
intended to ensure the financial soundness of the firm (LIASB, 2003, p.3). 
The solvency requirement determined by the standard included a solvency 
liability, expense reserve, resilience reserve and inadmissible assets reserve. 
The capital requirement included a new business reserve, inadmissible 
assets reserve, resilience reserve and capital adequacy liability. The capital 
requirement reserve was deemed to be at least equal to the solvency reserve. 
In this context the solvency reserve provides an early warning indicator to 
any potential problems the viability of the firm’s operations (APRA, 2003).  
In valuing assets and liabilities to determine solvency and capital 
adequacy reserves firms are required to use a ‘best estimate’ or market 
value basis approach. The previous Act had specified a Minimum Value 
Basis for the valuation of the liabilities of statutory funds. The information 
flowing from this method made it very difficult to establish relevant data on 
solvency margins. The solvency requirement is published in the financial 
statements of the life insurer and is a public indicator of the financial 
strength of the firm. The capital requirement is reported confidentially to 
the government regulator who makes an assessment on the soundness of the 
firm (LIASB, 2002, p.4).  
The changes made to prudential supervision of life insurers with the 
1995 Act introduced a number of measures which have contributed to 
reducing agency risks in the relationship between policy providers and 
policy holders. This has been achieved by the clarification of the obligations 
of specific parties, particularly directors, chief executive officers, actuaries 
and auditors. Specific reporting requirements which allow improved flows 
      20of information have been formalised and standardised. More rigorous 
solvency and capital adequacy requirements have provided a basis upon 
which the financial soundness can be judged. These measures will not 
prevent deliberate fraud occurring, as happened in the case of the 
Occidental and Regal. However they have introduced a number of 
innovative measures which protect and strengthen the position of life 
insurers in the financial sector. 
Conclusion 
Agency problems are an inherent part of financial markets where decision 
making responsibilities are delegated under conditions of imperfect 
information. Recognition of this fact has led to the development of 
regulatory regimes which offset and limit the worst outcomes of these 
relationships. However during periods of transition and institutional change 
existing governance processes may become weakened, opening the door to 
opportunistic behaviour with the potential to destablise the sector.  
  The case of the Occidental and Regal is an illustration of how this 
may occur. Aside from the illegality of the fraud against the Occidental and 
Regal the incident revealed more fundamental problems with the 
informational structures upon which life insurance contracts were based. 
There were no clearly established accounting standards for life insurers. 
Furthermore solvency requirements and disclosure standards were 
inadequate, making it very difficult for policy holders to make informed 
decisions. The innovative responses sparked by the incident lead to a major 
overhaul of the life insurance act in which these issues were directly 
addressed. Whilst the underlying approach to regulation did not alter, 
government and the industry worked together to develop a new set of 
standards within which the industry would operate. The new act clarified 
the responsibilities of directors, agents and actuaries and established 
common sets of actuarial and accounting standards. It reformed solvency 
requirements and introduced improved reporting and disclosure of financial 
information. Improved agency relationships resulted by increasing 
accountability and informational structures. 
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The case points to a dynamic and regenerative process which allows 
institutions to react and build on experience. The evolutionary approach 
adopted in this analysis suggests that responses will develop over time. 
Initial adaptive responses will be designed to stabilise the industry, limit 
contagion and protect stakeholders assets. Later innovative responses will 
lead to more fundamental improvements in information flow which improve 
agency outcomes. The analysis sheds light on how markets adapt and react 
to changing competitive environments. It suggests that the nature of agency 
relationships are continually evolving over time in response to a past 
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1 Casson (19970 explores the notion of information costs as a broader 
extension of transaction costs. Lazonick (2002) introduces the concept of an 
historical transformation methodology to provide an understanding of 
innovative enterprises. 
 
2 Each company was required to employ an ‘appointed actuary’ who was 
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